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Abstract 
 
This paper provides an empirical analysis of the impact of the financial crisis on 
households’ saving decisions in private pension schemes. We base our study on an 
original dataset made up of three sample surveys collected in 2008, in 2012 and in 
2015 by Mefop. Each survey has been conducted interviewing by phone more than 
10000 people in order to construct a representative sample of roughly 1000 
individual for each survey, which includes both members and not members of Italian 
pension funds. Each wave allows us to map saving decisions and personal 
characteristics (income, type of occupation, political orientation, financial literacy, 
etc.) in two distinct moment: before the crisis and after the crisis. Therefore we can 
identify the impact of the financial turmoil simply introducing a dummy variable. 
Results shows that the probability to invest in a private pension scheme has been 
barely touched and in some cases it is also possible to register an increase. 
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Introduction 
 
As all developed countries, Italy faces up to the sustainability of the public pension 
system, threatened by the ageing of the population and the drop in the number of 
new born. The pay as you go scheme has been overhauled more times from mid ’90 
to achieve financial balance and today the path of public pension expenditure is 
under control.  
Conversely more efforts have to be still done on the field of the adequacy of the 
treatments. The scheduled increases in the retirement age will play an important 
role but a key contribution to this achievement is linked to the soar in membership 
of pension funds. However they still continue to remain slightly thin. At the end of 
2014 employees enrolled in pension funds still represented only 28% of potential 
members (Covip 2015).  
Even though Italian employees (and not only) seem to be more aware of the need to 
hedge the risk of an inadequate income at retirement, pension funds still struggle to 
be recognized as the best way to deal with the issue.  When asked on the main 
actions to tackle the expected decrease in the coverage of public pensions, Italian 
workforce mainly refers to savings different from pension funds like mutual funds, 
government bond and real estate as the preferred way to save for retirement.     
The paper analyses the main determinants of pension funds membership and tries 
to evaluate whether financial turmoil affected membership in Italy. It uses an 
original dataset based on the survey realized by Mefop1 in 2008, 2012 and 2015 on 
the Italian workforce. This period if plenty of significant events, both on the financial 
markets (subprime mortgages crisis, bankruptcy of Lehmann Brothers, Piigs crisis) 
and on the legislative field (enforcement of the new regulation on pension funds, 
Monti-Fornero reform of the fist pillar). The data can help to investigate whether 
financial crisis change the attitude and the perception of pension funds among 
Italian workforce.   
For Italy, the paper represents the first attempt to study the phenomenon of the 
pension funds membership and the effects of financial crisis on the choices of the 
Italian employees towards second pillar.   
                                                          
1 Mefop is a public body jointly owned by the Italian Ministry of Tresuary and Finance and about 90 pension funds, 
both occupational and personal. 
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The paper is organized as follow: in the first paragraph the structure of the public 
and private Italian pension system is analyzed, than the review of the literature and 
the description of the dataset will follow and finally the empirical strategy and the 
main findings will be discussed, with reference to some policy conclusions. Tables 
and Figures are reported in the Appendix. 
 
1.The Italian pension system 
 
1.1The public pillar: how it works 
 
From the mid ’90 the Italian public pension scheme is a sort of “work in progress” 
due to the occurred changes to ensure its financial sustainability. However two are 
the breakthrough reforms. The first was made in 1995 when a notional defined 
benefit (NDC) scheme (reform Dini) was introduced. Under the Dini framework the 
NDC scheme only applied to employees with less than 15 years of qualifying 
contribution payed at January 1, 1996. Contrary, for those who accrued at least 15 
years of qualifying contribution payed at January 1, 1996 nothing change and their 
treatment continued to be bases on their wage.  
After some parametric maintenances, in December 2011, under the pressure of the 
financial markets concerned about the sustainability of the huge public debt burden 
the Parliament passed a new reform (reform Monti-Fornero) which is currenly in 
force. From January 1, 2012 the NDC scheme apply also to the employees excluded 
by the Dini reform, i.e. those with at least 15 years of qualifying contribution payed 
at January 1, 1996. The Monti-Fornero reform also increased the retirement age 
from 65 to 67 beginning January 2012.  
Public pension scheme is still a Pay as you go system, so to deal with the ageing of 
the population pension age and annuity factor to determine the treatment are 
automatically adjusted to life expectancy every three years, and from 2019 the 
adjustment will be made every two years. 
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1.2The private pillar: how it works 
 
The legislative framework of Italian pension funds has been strongly revised in 2005 
and come into force from January 2008. 
Pension funds membership is voluntary but a mechanism of automatic enrolment is 
in force. When starting a job an employee has 6 months to decide whether to join a 
pension fund, if the choice is not made in due time he is enrolled in a pension fund 
which is established on the basis of the law (usually an occupational pension fund).   
Despite the automatic enrolment procedure in place, membership still remain low 
and asymmetrically distributed among economic sectors. At the end of 2014 only 
28% of the potential employees joined a pension fund. Moreover membership are 
under-developed in economic sectors where mid and small companies prevail 
(commerce and trade, touristic sector…), for female, young employees, in south-
island regions, in the public sector. 
Pension funds are mainly defined contribution, meaning that members bear all the 
financial risks; finally there is a common level playing field between occupational 
and personal pensions. All pension funds, no matter their nature, share the same 
rules on governance, investments, information, tax treatment. 
 
2.Review of the literature  
 
The analysis of the literature shows that the pension funds membership is a multi- 
dimensional phenomenon in which a lot of factors may affect the choice: working 
conditions and financial skills of the employees, assets and income constraints, 
degree of trust on financial investments and on pension funds, behavoir of the 
workers as well.  
The probability to join a pension fund strongly vary on the dimension of the 
company, it is usually higher for employees of big companies than small one. That 
asymmetry is presumably due to the costs for the employer to set up a pension fund 
and to the risks of the bankruptcy of the scheme, particularly for defined benefits 
schemes (Dummann (2008), Horiba e Yoshida (2002)). These differences are 
consequently reflected in the economic sectors: where big companies prevail the 
probability to join a pension funds raises (financial sector, public utilities, public 
sector…), viceversa where small and medium companies prevail the probability to 
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become member of a pension fund is lower (commerce and trade, touristic sector, 
building and constructions…).  
The membership of a pension fund seems to be linked also with the union 
membership and the age of employees2. If on the one hand employees and their 
representatives have the incentives to ask for the provision of a substantial total 
compensation (wage, health and pension coverage, other fringe benefits), the risk to 
be fired could act as a brake to wage claims (included the demand for pension 
coverage) as the request could trigger an increase in the costs related to the staff of 
the company.  
However, employees members of a union are less likely subjected to layoff, they are 
usually enough close to retirement and so they could be more incentivated to ask 
for a pension scheme coverage by the employer. It seems to exist a close link 
between the participation to a union, the age of the employees and the pension 
funds membership. Therefore, it is not surprising that the probability to join a 
pension fund increases with the age of the employees and union membership  while 
it is low for young employees and for those not enrolled into a union (Dummann 
2008, McCarthy 2006, Ghilarducci e Lee 2005, Andrietti 2000, Heinz e Turner 1998, 
Maelli e Pudney 1996, Even e McPherson 1994, Allen et al.(1993), Disney and 
Cameron (1990) Freeman (1981 and 1985), Long and Scott (1982)).      
 
Another relevant issue in the evaluation of pension funds participation is the degree 
of financial literacy. Lusardi, Michaud e Mitchell (2013) find out that employees with 
low level of assets are also usually poorly financially skilled, while workers with high 
level of assets are strongly financially educated. Furthermore, Lusardi and Mitchell 
(2014) show that, when dealing with complex economic choices (including pensions 
issues), high financially skilled people are more likely to achieve a higher degree of 
welfare then poorly financially educated one. 
 
Other key elements to determine pension funds membership are assets (both 
financial and real estate) and income constraints, especially where the participation 
is voluntary and incentivated by tax reliefs. As regard Germany, for example, 
Dummann (2008) highliths that participation rates are higher for wealthy employees 
than poorer one.  Another aspect which influences the behaviour of being member 
of a pension fund is the degree of trust on financial investments. Boeri and Zingales 
                                                          
2 For an in depth analysis of the interactions between provision of welfare state and unions see: Brugiavini et.al. 
(2001) 
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(2007) highlight that the probability to join a pension fund increases from 15% to 
27% for people characterized by an high level of trust on financial markets3. 
 
Finally, the membership of a pensin fund could also be related to the so called social 
interaction. Usually people deal with complex economic choices without having 
adequate skills. They go beyond this gap by reling their decisions on the behavoirs of 
their relatives, collegues or friends. This phenomenon has also been documented in 
the field of pension’s choices.  
Duflo and Saez (2004 e 2005) treated a sample of employees of different 
departments of a Us university with a training course on pension funds. The 
attendace has been incentivated with a financial reward. First of all they find out 
that the participation to the pension scheme after 5 and 7 months from the 
treatment was greater for the deparments involved in the training course. Than, and 
more relevant, they find out no substantial differencies within the departments 
involved in the treatment, in the participation rates of treated and not treated 
employees. Duflo and Saez link this surprising finding to the social interaction 
between employees of the same department.  
In The Netherlands Vermeer, van Rooij and van Vooren (2014) highliths that 
employees tend to postpone their retirement if their peers do the same. On average 
they find out that an increare of one year in the age of retirement leads to a delay of 
three months in the own retirement. 
 
  
3. The dataset  
 
The dataset collects the data of three surveys carried out by Mefop on june 2008 
and november 20124. The questionnaires have been submitted to a sample of 900 
interviewees, randomly picked out from the Italian workforce, and equally balanced 
between members and not members of pension funds. The sub samples of 
members and not members reflect the features of the reference populations in the 
year of the survey. Sub samples of members and not members are weighted on the 
basis of the percentage of employees enrolled and not enrolled in pension funds. 
The samples of the three surveys have been also weighted on the basis of gender, 
age, place of residence and type of job. 
                                                          
3 The average employee of the sample has the following features: male, forty years old, with a child, white-collar, 
secondary degree of education  
4 Mefop (2014, 2011) 
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For the interview the Cati methodology (Computer-assisted telephone interviewing) 
has been used and only land-line interviews were collected. The surveys have 
involved all types of employees (public, private and self employed) in order to check 
the behaviours of the workforce as a whole, not only of those who have to choose 
whether to contribute pension funds with the Trattamento di fine rapporto (Tfr)5.    
The questionnaires were arranged in the same way. The introductory section 
mapped both the social-demographic and wealth features of the sample. The first 
part was open to the sample as a whole in order to detect the degree of knowledge 
of the cornerstones of the retirement systems, both public and private: financing 
mechanisms (pay as you go and funded systems), ratio of the retirement treatment 
(defined benefit and defined contribution), substitution rates, profitability and 
safety, degree of trust in pension funds. The third section only involved the 
members of pension funds to verify their sentiment and the level of satisfaction 
toward the membership and the investment choices. The last part was reserved to 
the workers still not members of pension funds in order to study the reasons of their 
choices and purposes.  
Having kept unchanged the structure of the questionnaires, having always used the 
CATI methodology and having selected samples based on the same variables allows 
us to appreciate whether and to what extent financial turmoil affected the attitude 
and the behaviour of the Italian workforce towards second pillar schemes.  
 
As shown in Table 1, the dataset contains a rich set of information on the socio-
demographic characteristics and on wealth and income situation as well of the 
interviewees. Information on occupational condition are also surveyed.  
 
The samples are mainly represented by private employees (65% in 2008, 60% in 
2012), self-employers represent about ¼ of the sample (24% in 2008, 25% in 2012). 
Public employees represent only a marginal share of the samples (11% in 2008, 15% 
in 2012). The distribution of the samples on the basis to the type of employment 
reproduces that of Italian workforce from which the sample has been randomly 
surveyed. 
                                                          
5 The Trattamento di fine rapporto is a severance payment due at the end of the working relationship (retirement, 
sacking or resignation). The Tfr represents a “deferred wage” as it is monthly accrued at the rate of 6.91% of the wage. 
Tfr only involves private employees; it is not a financial investment as its rate of return is fixed by the law and is equal 
to 1.5% plus 75% of the inflation rate. When starting a job the employee has to choose whether to pay the Tfr to a 
pension fund, becoming member.   
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The allocation of the samples on the basis of the type of occupation is due to the 
fact that the enrolment in a supplementary pension schemes is closely linked to the 
TFR which is currently de facto limited to private employees. It implies that in the 
sub sample of members there are more private employees than in those of not 
members (77% vs. 53% in 2008, 72% vs. 56% in 2012). Both in 2008 and 2012 public 
employees are over-weighted in the sub group of not members than in those of 
members. Finally, as regard self-employed, while in 2008 they prevailed among not 
members (28% vs. 20%), in 2012 the percentages are the same and equal to 25%.  
 
As regard gender, and in line with what is observed at national level, the samples of 
2008 and 2012 see a prevalence of males (64% in 2008, 60% in 2012). The difference 
between the two genders increases for members while decrease for not members. 
 
The distributions based on the age cohorts show that members represent the 
majority in the cohort 35-54 years old. The number of interviewees enrolled in a 
supplementary pension scheme with an age of at least 55 year old raises from 10% 
in 2008 to 17% in 2012. More generally members represent the majority in the 
cohorts 35-54 years old and 55 and more years old. Contrary not members prevail in 
the age cohort 18-34. 
 
As regard the place of residence the majority of the respondents are located in the 
north regions both for members and not members (64% in 2008 and 59% in 2012). 
Members of Unions prevail within members while interviewees who declared not to 
be enrolled in a Union prevail among not members. As regard the political ideology, 
while in 2008 there was a slightly prevalence of right-centre right employees, in 
2012 things change and left-centre left represent the majority. Finally as regard the 
degree of education, both in 2008 and in 2012 interviewees declaring a high school 
degree represent the most relevant share of the sample.  
 
The survey contains some questions on the degree of trust in pension funds that 
have been used to check whether financial crisis affected trust on second pillar 
schemes, hence the probability to join a pension fund. The questions, which asks the 
interviewees the level of agreement (fully agree, partial agree, little agree, no agree) 
were the following: 
x Pension funds are an instrument to get an adequate level of pension 
x Pension funds are a financial investment safer than other 
x Pension funds are a financial investment that benefits of more tax incentives 
than other 
x Pension funds only make banks, insurance companies and unions richer. 
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The survey also contains some questions on confidence towards public and private 
pensions that we have used to check whether financial crisis affected trust on the 
two pillars, hence the probability to join a pension fund.  
The first question asked a judgement on the fact that public pension will be enough 
for the needs of old age6. The second and the third questions asked, respectively, a 
judgement on the safest and more profitable pension system7. 
 
 
4. The empirical strategy and the main findings 
 
To estimate whether financial turmoil affected the probability to join a pension 
fund a probit model defined by the following equation has been used: 
 
 
                                         (1) 
 
where: 
t = survey wave index 
   = dummy=1 if interviewee is a pension fund member 
Y = survey wave dummy (2008 omitted) 
   = matrix of occupational, wealth and income variables 
   = matrix of ideology and demographic variables 
   = matrix of variable related to confidence in pension funds 
   = error component 
 
To estimate the effect of financial crisis on pension fund membership a dummy 
which takes value one when associated to the 2012 wave has been used. The effect 
of the financial crisis is measured through the values associated to the coefficient 
  ,  which estimates ceteris paribus the change in the memberships probability 
between 2008 and 2012. 
 
Four different specifications of the model have been estimated to take into account 
the confounding effects due of the Monti-Fornero reform and the levels of trust in 
pension funds (PFs). The first two specifications refer to all the sample while 
(alternatively controlling for the levels of trust in PFs), the third and the fourth ones 
are based only on the sub sample of respondents not affected by the Monti-Fornero 
                                                          
6 Do you think that the only public pension will be sufficient to cover the needs after retirement? Yes; Yes but with 
difficulties; No I have to change my standard of living; No absolutely 
7 What is the safest pension system? What the more profitable pension system? Public; Private; Public and private are 
similar 
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reform (alternatively controlling for the levels of trust in PFs). We believe that the 
latter specifications better identify the effects of financial crisis on membership as 
they only take into account the workers not affected by the new legislative 
framework on first pillar of 2012 that had a huge impact on pension issues in public 
opinion. 
 
At first sight it should be reasonable to expect a negative impact of the financial 
crisis in pension funds membership given the effect it produced on Italian economy, 
particularly what happened in 2011/2012. The soar of interest rates on Italian public 
debt forced the government to quickly adopt strong budget measure among which 
the Monti-Fornero reform of public pension. A long phase of recession started in 
that period and only in the last months GDP growth come back positive.  However  
looking at the path of the workers enrolled in pension funds (Fig.1) it never 
decreases, not even during the periods of financial difficulties, so may be realistic 
not to expect a negative effect of financial turmoil on membership rates. 
 
Table 2 summarizes the effects of financial crisis on pension funds membership. 
Looking at the overall sample, financial events negatively affect pension fund 
membership as the marginal probability associated to coefficient    is slightly 
negative. Moreover, turmoil of markets did not affect the level of trust in pension 
funds as including the variables related to the confidence on supplementary 
schemes the marginal probability associated to the coefficient    increases. 
 
Our findings reverse when restricting the analysis to the sub sample of employees 
not affected by the Monti-Fornero reform: in fact the marginal probability 
associated to    become slightly positive although not statistically significant. As 
previously illustrated this group of interviewees represents those for which the 
notional defined contribution scheme was already in place from 1996. They were 
not touched by the measures of 2012 (at least as regard the way in which the 
treatment in computed) and so, only for this group it is possible to measure the 
“real effect” of financial crisis. For employees affected by the Monti-Fornero reform 
the outcome of    could be determined in a certain level by the changes in the 
public scheme. 
 
Financial crisis did not negatively affected  membership of pension funds, the 
negative sign in the value of    as regard the overall sample is presumably due to 
the effect of the measure adopted by the Parliament on the field of first pillar. The 
consequences associated to that strong measures hugely influenced the feeling of 
the employees, affecting also fields not directly affected neither by negative 
financial events nor by legislative changes like pension funds.    
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In the end we can conclude that pension funds are perceived as a safe way to save 
for retirement. 
 
As regards the other variables that affect the membership probability, the estimates 
reported in Table 3 confirm the role of the enrolment in a union and the age of the 
employees. For interviewees members of a union the probability to join a 
supplementary pension increases of 13% than not members (9% in the case of those 
not affected by Monti-Fornero reform). For interviewees aged above 55 the 
probability to join a pension fund increases of 24% than those aged between 18 and 
34 (33% for those not affected by Monti-Fornero reform). 
 
The probability to join a pension fund increases for interviewees with financial 
investments different from pension funds even though the marginal probability is 
not statistically relevant (see Table 3). This result is not really a surprise that the 
probability to be enrolled in a pension fund decreases when interviewees own real 
estate investment. Real estate is the main form of saving in Italy and the large 
majority of households own the house where they live.  
 
As reported in Table 4, the probability to become member of a pension fund is also 
affected from the ideology of the interviewees8. Even though it is difficult to 
establish a clear causal relation between pension funds membership and ideology, 
at first sight we could assume that a conservative political feeling, and so more right 
oriented, should more favourably looks to a pension system privately managed. 
Instead, a leftist  feeling should more favourably looks to a pension system managed 
by the state. The findings seems in line with this expectations.  
 
Finally, as reported in Table 5 and 6, also the confidence in the pension system and 
in pension funds has a great influence on the probability to be enrolled in a 
supplementary pension scheme. In particular, as expected, the marginal probability 
is lower for interviewees  who do not agree on the following statements: 1) Pension 
funds are an instrument to get an adequate level of pension; 2) Pension funds are a 
financial investment safer than other; 3) Pension funds are a financial investment 
that benefits of more tax incentives than other.  
 
Other variables like degree of education, income, type of employment, gender and 
geographic location of the interviewees do not affect membership.   
 
As a main robustness check tables from 7 to 10 report the analysis of the 
membership probability conducted estimating the probit model in (1) separately on 
                                                          
8 In the survey there was a question on the political feeling: No matter your vote to the last elections, what’s your 
political ideology? Left, Centre-left, Centre, Centre-right, Right.  
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the two waves.  From 2008 to 2012 only few changes happened, the behaviour of 
the variables is substantially stable. The more relevant covariates affecting 
enrolment are the age and the union membership. The consequences of the 
financial turmoil can be read in the following results: the impact of the variables 
related to the trust in pension funds show that pension funds are perceived safer 
than other financial investments, the need of a pension fund coverage to achieve an 
adequate pension become statistically significant in 2012. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Our findings confirm the expectation that financial turmoil did not affect pension 
funds membership; trust towards pension funds continued to remain high also 
during the dramatic events occurred to the Italian interest rates in 2010-2011. In the 
end our analysis shows that pension funds are perceived as a safe way to save for 
retirement.  
 
Final results, however, also confirms the problematic situation for pension funds 
membership in Italy. The probability to be enrolled in a supplementary pension 
scheme is high for old employees who are also members of a union and own a 
strong financial position. Members of pension funds belong to the categories of 
employees who have a lower need to be covered form a supplementary pension 
scheme. In fact they are usually full time workers, they benefit of high safeguarding 
job contracts and their pension will be quasi-fully based on their last wage. Instead, 
the outsiders, above all young employees, are characterized by less favourable 
working conditions: part-time or temporary contracts with low levels of safeguards 
and reduced pension contributions. Moreover, their pension will be fully based on 
the amount of contributions.    
 
How to tackle the problem of adequacy of pensions for that employees? Hopefully 
supplementary pension schemes should play a key role, also taking into account 
their high level of safety during financial troubles. So, how to strengthen 
membership? Presumably the voluntary approach is no more sustainable. Foreign 
experiences like UK, USA, Australia, The Netherlands, New Zealand show that 
membership can only substantially growth with a mandatory or quasi-mandatory 
approach. Italian legislation already states a form of automatic enrolment however 
up to now it did not provides positive achievements. Italian legislator should 
evaluate whether to modify the legislative framework on automatic enrolment. A 
more feasible solution could be to introduce a real form of automatic enrolment 
into the collective bargaining and in deed this seems the solution social parties are 
involved to practice.     
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Appendix – Table and Figures 
 
Table 1 – The structure of the panel dataset  
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Table 2 – The effect of financial crisis on memberships probability 
 
p-values in brackets, coefficient point estimates report marginal effects 
 
Table 3 – The Impact of occupational, wealth and income variables on 
memberships probability 
 
p-values in brackets, coefficient point estimates report marginal effects 
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Table 4 – The impact of social variables on memberships probability 
 
p-values in brackets, coefficient point estimates report marginal effects 
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Table 5 – The impact of confidence in the pension systems on memberships 
probability 
 
p-values in brackets, coefficient point estimates report marginal effects 
 
Table 6 – The impact of confidence in pension funds on memberships probability 
 
p-values in brackets, coefficient point estimates report marginal effects 
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Table 7 – Two waves analysis – all sample, impact of socio-economic variables on 
memberships probability 
 
p-values in brackets, coefficient point estimates report marginal effects 
 
Table 8 – Two waves analysis – all sample the impact of confidence in PFs on 
memberships probability 
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p-values in brackets, coefficient point estimates report marginal effects 
Table 9 – Two waves analysis – only respondents not affected by 2012 pension 
system reform, impact of socio-economic variables on memberships probability 
 
p-values in brackets, coefficient point estimates report marginal effects 
 
Table 10 – Two waves analysis – only respondents not affected by 2012 pension 
system reform, impact of confidence in PFs on memberships probability 
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p-values in brackets, coefficient point estimates report marginal effects 
Figure 1 – Membership of pension funds (1999-2014) 
 
 Source: Covip (2014) 
